This study develops an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied research to analyze the growth and welfare e¤ects of two patent instruments (a) the patentability of basic R&D and (b) the division of pro…t between basic and applied researchers. We …nd that for the purpose of stimulating basic R&D and economic growth simultaneously, increasing the share of pro…t assigned to basic researchers is more e¤ective than raising the patentability of basic R&D, which has either a negative e¤ect or an inverted-U e¤ect on technological progress. Nonetheless, a benevolent patent authority requires both patent instruments to achieve the socially optimal allocation in the decentralized economy.
Introduction
Basic (or fundamental) research is an important part of the innovation process by expanding the frontier of human knowledge. However, unlike applied research, it may not lead to immediate marketable applications. Therefore, basic research is often underprovided and has to be funded by the public sector. Given the importance of basic R&D, the European Research Council was o¢cially launched in 2007 as the …rst European funding body to support and promote fundamental research. An important policy lever for incentivizing basic research is the patentability of basic R&D. For example, the European Union directive on biotechnological patents (passed in 1998 and implemented by all of the 27 EU member states by the end of 2006) has increased the patentability of biotechnological inventions in Europe. This directive provides that "inventions ... shall be patentable even if they concern a product consisting of or containing biological material or a process by means of which biological material is produced, processed or used" and that "biological material which is isolated from its natural environment or produced by means of a technical process may be the subject of an invention even if it previously occurred in nature." In other words, biological material could be patentable in Europe as a result of this directive. As for the US, in the court case of Diamond vs. Chakrabarty of 1980, the Supreme Court ruled that genetically modi…ed organisms could be patentable.
Another important example of patentability of basic R&D is the BayhDole Act or University and Small Business Patent Procedures Act of 1980.
As a result of this Act, universities in the US are granted the right to patent and license the results of federal government funded research. In a comprehensive review of the Bayh-Dole Act, Mowery et al. (2004) argue that although this Act is one of the several key factors that contributed to the signi…cant increase in patenting and licensing of university inventions, many of the historical contributions from universities to industrial innovation took place without patenting. Furthermore, when universities patent their inventions, other researchers are restricted from using these basic research outputs until the patents expire. Therefore, Mowery et al. (2004) conclude that it is important for universities to recommit to the free ‡ow of knowledge that has historically enhanced industrial innovation. However, most OECD countries currently give universities the right to patent their government-funded inventions (OECD 2002) .
In this study, we develop an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied research to analyze how the patentability of basic R&D a¤ects economic growth and social welfare. On the one hand, we …nd that increasing the patentability of basic R&D increases patented basic inventions that contribute to economic growth as the conventional argument suggests. On the other hand, it reduces knowledge spillovers because more basic research outputs are patented and hence not accessible by other researchers. Given these opposing e¤ects, we …nd that patentability of basic R&D may have an inverted-U e¤ect on technological progress. 2 The intuition behind this non-monotonic e¤ect is based on the tradeo¤ between patent protection and knowledge spillovers. Putting it simply, increasing the patentability of basic R&D increases patented basic inventions that contribute to economic growth; however, this policy change also decreases the accumulation of what we call "pure knowledge," which is freely available to all researchers. Our analysis reveals that these two opposite forces interact with each other to potentially generate a non-monotonic relationship between patent protection for basic inventions and technological progress. Furthermore, we …nd that patentability of basic R&D has a monotonically negative e¤ect on economic growth when knowledge spillovers depend only on pure knowledge (but not on patented basic inventions). Intuitively, an increase in the patentability of basic R&D generates a negative e¤ect on the accumulation of pure knowledge as expected and an additional surprising negative crowding-out e¤ect on basic R&D. This crowding-out e¤ect on basic R&D occurs because raising the patentability of basic R&D increases the stock of industrially applicable basic inventions, which in turn improves the incentives for applied R&D by so much that basic R&D falls. Therefore, patentability of basic R&D may not be an ideal policy instrument for stimulating basic research.
In addition to the patentability of basic R&D, we also consider a second related patent instrument that is the division of pro…t between basic and applied researchers. 3 We show that unlike the patentability of basic R&D, the share of pro…t assigned to basic researchers has a monotonically positive e¤ect on the equilibrium growth rate. Intuitively, strengthening the bargaining power of basic researchers stimulates basic R&D without sti ‡ing the spillover e¤ects of pure knowledge while increasing the patentability of basic R&D reduces spillovers from pure knowledge. Therefore, strengthening the bargaining power of basic researchers relative to applied researchers may be a superior policy instrument in achieving the dual objectives of stimulating basic R&D and economic growth. However, characterizing the optimal coordination of the two patent instruments, we …nd that a benevolent patent authority requires both patent instruments to achieve the socially optimal allocation in the decentralized economy.
Our study relates to the R&D-based growth literature. 4 This literature emphasizes two fundamental factors for endogenous technological progress. First, the patent institution matters. Without su¢cient patent protection, investors would have insu¢cient incentives to invest resources in R&D activities due to the public nature of knowledge. Another essence is the widespread spillover of knowledge, which plays the critical role as a source of long-run economic growth. An inevitable tradeo¤ emerges between patent protection and knowledge spillovers. Patent protection encourages private incentives for innovation but also limits the wide-spread use of patented inventions. This latter e¤ect weakens knowledge spillovers from pure knowl-edge. Although patent protection and knowledge spillovers are fundamental for long-run technological progress, there hasn't been much analysis on their tradeo¤ in the context of an R&D-based growth model. We …ll this gap in the literature by explicitly analyzing this tradeo¤ in an endogenous growth model with basic and applied R&D.
Our study also relates to the literature on optimal patent design for which Nordhaus (1969) provides the seminal analysis on optimal patent length. Scotchmer (2004) provides a comprehensive review on the subsequent developments in this patent-design literature. While studies in this literature are mostly based on a partial-equilibrium framework, our study follows more closely a related macroeconomic literature by providing a dynamic generalequilibrium (DGE) analysis on patent policy. In the macroeconomic literature on patent policy, the seminal DGE analysis on optimal patent length is Judd (1985) , who shows that the optimal patent length can be in…nite. Subsequent studies by Horowitz and Lai (1996) , Kwan and Lai (2003) , Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) The present paper complements these studies by analyzing the optimal coordination of multiple patent instruments, which is often neglected in this literature, in an R&D-based growth model with multiple research sectors. 5 The rest of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 analyzes the e¤ects of patent policies on economic growth and social welfare. The …nal section concludes.
2 An R&D-based growth model with basic and applied R&D
In this section, we extend the seminal R&D-based growth model in Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991) by introducing two types of innovative activities, basic R&D and applied R&D. 6 To model the patentability of basic R&D, we assume that some basic research outputs are patentable while others are not. The probability that a basic research output is patentable captures the degree of patentability of basic R&D. A basic invention that is not patented becomes pure knowledge, which is freely available to all researchers. A patented basic invention is eventually matched with an applied invention subject to a stochastic process. After this match occurs, the matched inventions generate monopolistic pro…ts, and the pro…ts are shared between the basic and applied researchers subject to a pro…t-division rule. For simplicity, we assume that patent length is in…nite as in the seminal Romer model.
The basic setup
Consider a continuous-time model, in which there is an in…nitely lived representative household. As in Aghion and Howitt (1996) , the household inelastically supplies L units of unskilled labor and H units of skilled labor at each date t. Unskilled and skilled labors are used for manufacturing and R&D respectively. The household is endowed with a standard log utility function U = R 1 0 e t ln C t dt; where > 0 is the discount rate and C t is the consumption of …nal goods at date t: Final goods are used for consumption only. Given C t as the numeraire, standard dynamic optimization yields the familiar Euler equation given by
, where r t is the interest rate. Consumption goods are produced by a standard CES (constant elasticity of substitution) aggregator over a continuum of patented intermediate goods 6 See Aghion and Howitt (1996) for a seminal growth model with basic and applied R&D. Our model is also related to Michelacci (2003) , who explicitly distinguishes between R&D and entrepreneurship as two types of innovative activities in a quality-ladder setting. See also Akiyama (2009) and Cozzi and Galli (2009a) . However, these studies do not consider the patentability of basic R&D or the knowledge spillovers of pure knowledge.
where N t is the number of intermediate goods ( 
An industrial monopolist i holds the patents on the manufacturing technology of product i and produces X t (i) = X t units of intermediate goods earning pro…t t (i) = t at each date t. The value of being the monopolist in
r s ds is the cumulative interest rates up to date .
Patented basic inventions and pure knowledge
The economy grows endogenously due to two forms of technological progress. The …rst growth engine is the accumulation of patented inventions. As mentioned above, an industrial monopolist i holds the two patents of wellmatched basic and applied inventions. A basic invention is a preliminary idea, which cannot bear any pro…t by itself but may establish the basis for a future invention that generates pro…ts by introducing a new variety of intermediate goods. We call such a pro…table invention an applied invention. When an applied invention is developed on a patented basic invention that previously has not been matched, a new industry is introduced into the intermediate goods market by the industrial monopolist holding the patents of basic and applied inventions. This process of patented inventions continuously occurs and contributes towards the variety N t of intermediate goods in (1) . The productivity of consumption goods …rms thus increases over time.
The second engine of technological progress is the accumulation of "pure knowledge." We introduce pure knowledge into the model as a by-product of basic research activity in the following manner. With our consideration on the patentability of basic R&D, some basic inventions are randomly chosen to be patentable by the patent institution while others are not patentable. Formally, each newly developed basic invention is patentable with probability . An unpatented basic invention contributes to pure knowledge that is freely available to all researchers, consequently having a knowledge spillover e¤ect on R&D activity as in the knowledge-driven growth model of Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). Here we assume that applied inventions must be derived from patented basic inventions because any applied invention that is derived from public pure knowledge is not patentable.
Current research productivity depends on both patented basic inventions and pure knowledge. Denote by K t the cumulative number of unpatented basic inventions that have been accumulated as of date t: This K t represents the stock of pure knowledge in the economy at date t. In this setting, we intend to di¤erentiate between pure knowledge and patented inventions in their external spillover e¤ects. To do so, we assume that the knowledge spillover e¤ect is a function of the stocks of pure knowledge and patented inventions, but these two inputs are not perfectly substitutable. 7 Furthermore, we consider two special cases in which the spillover e¤ect depends only on either pure knowledge or patented basic inventions. 7 It is useful to consider an alternative but related interpretation on . If we think of as a technological parameter instead of a policy instrument, could be interpreted as the share of basic inventions that are industrially applicable. These basic inventions are naturally granted a patent. The remaining share 1 of basic inventions is pure research output, such as a mathematical theorem. Under this interpretation, it is natural that applied inventions are developed only on patented (i.e., industrially applicable) basic inventions and that the stocks of pure knowledge and patented inventions are not perfectly substitutable. Also, we can relate this interpretation to the patentability of basic R&D. Increasing the patentability of basic R&D signi…cantly encourages patenting of university inventions (Mowery et al. 2004) , resulting into an increase in the share of industrially applicable basic inventions. Therefore, increasing the patentability of basic R&D can also be captured by an increase in under this alternative interpretation. 8 
Basic and applied R&D
As mentioned above, the economy grows as the two factors of technological progress, N t and K t , accumulate. The two factors increase as basic inventions are developed and then industrially applied. In this section, we explain how inventions are made and applied to industries and how inventions increase pure knowledge of the economy. There are in…nitely many potential researchers. Potential researchers can make both basic and applied inventions. Denote by B t the cumulative number (stock) of total basic inventions. The stock of basic inventions B t increases due to basic research activity by researchers. The accumulation of B t gradually increases the two growth factors, N t and K t , through the three stages of research to be described below.
Stage I (Patented basic inventions and pure knowledge)
When a potential researcher invests b=S (K t ; B t K t ) units of skilled labor in basic research, she can develop a basic invention j without any risk of failure. In this setting, the spillover function S(:) captures the extent to which the stocks of pure knowledge K t and patented basic inventions B t K t a¤ect research productivity through knowledge spillovers. We adopt a simple Cobb-Douglas functional form for the spillover function S ( 8 where 2 [0; 1] is a factor share parameter that controls how pure knowledge K t a¤ects the magnitude of knowledge spillovers. 2 f0; 1g captures the special cases in which the spillover e¤ect depends only on either patented basic inventions B t K t or pure knowledge K t .
Each newly developed basic invention is judged as patentable with probability 2 (0; 1), and basic inventions that are not patented become pure knowledge. Thus, at date t, : B t units of patentable basic inventions and (1 )
B t units of pure knowledge are introduced. We can describe the evolution of pure knowledge as
Denote Z t as the market value of a basic invention that is patentable. Free entry guarantees the following no-arbitrage condition in equilibrium.
where w s t denotes the wage rate of skilled labor at date t.
Stage II (Basic inventions waiting for applied inventions)
Basic inventions that are patentable at date t, with size 
Stage III (Basic inventions becoming industrially applied)
We now turn to applied research activities. Applied researchers make applied inventions that can be matched with basic inventions in the waiting pool.
As a result of a successful match, a new industry is introduced into the intermediate goods sector increasing N t . When an applied researcher invests t a=S (K t ; B t K t ) units of skilled labor in matching with basic invention j, she can develop an applied invention that is well matched with the basic invention with probability t . At the aggregate level, it holds that
In other words, a fraction t of the waiting basic inventions W t becomes industrially applied at date t.
Once basic and applied inventions are matched, the patent holders of these inventions can earn and share the …nal market value V t . This value V t is shared between the patent holders of basic and applied inventions according to a pro…t-division rule s 2 (0; 1). The basic invention takes sV t and the applied invention takes (1 s) V t . Then, we can describe the free-entry condition to applied R&D as
Recall that the patent holder of a basic invention takes sV t , earning a net value sV t Z t . Therefore, the market value Z t of a patented basic invention satis…es the following no-arbitrage condition.
The …nal value of an invention V t (i.e., the value of a pair of matched basic and applied inventions) follows the familiar Bellman equation.
Through the above three stages, basic and applied R&D governs technological progress and economic growth. There are two roles of basic inventions in technological progress. One is the role to increase the stock of pure knowledge K t in the …rst stage. The other is the role to increase the number of industrially applicable basic inventions W t and eventually the variety of intermediate goods N t . These two roles interact with each other to drive technological progress and economic growth.
Market equilibrium
The stock of total basic inventions B t can be divided into three parts as follows.
This equation states that the stock of basic inventions B t is divided into pure knowledge K t , patented basic inventions W t that have not been industrially applied, and patented basic inventions N t that have been industrially applied. We now close the model by considering the labor market equilibrium conditions.
for unskilled labor, and
for skilled labor. Here we normalize the total supply of skilled labor to unity. The left-hand side of (12) is the total supply of skilled labor and the righthand side is the total demand for skilled labor from applied research and basic research, respectively.
From (2)- (12), we can completely characterize the equilibrium dynamics of our model. Before proceeding, we de…ne a balanced growth path in our model. On the balanced growth path, variables for cumulative inventions B t , K t , N t , and W t grow at a constant rate g , which we call the equilibrium growth rate of technology, and the balanced growth rate of consumption is equal to _ C t =C t = g c = g =(" 1). Taking into account the laws of motion (3), (5) and (6), we have the following steady-state ratios K=B = 1 , N=B = =( + g ) and W=B = g =( + g ) on the balanced-growth path. Using these ratios and (12), the equilibrium growth rate of technology is
where H B 2 (0; 1) is the equilibrium amount of high-skill labor allocated to basic R&D. Similarly, the equilibrium arrival rate of applied inventions is
where H A is the equilibrium amount of high-skill labor allocated to applied R&D.
Equating (4) and (7) yields a no-arbitrage condition between basic and applied R&D given by (1 s) V t =a = Z t =b. Imposing the balanced-growth condition on (8) yields Z t = sV t =( + r g z ), where r = + g c from the Euler equation and g z = g c g from (2). Combining these two conditions yields b a
This condition along with 1 = H A + H B , (13) and (14) solves the model. In the following analysis, we restrict attention to the feasible region of given by 2 ( L ; 1), where L (b=a) (1 s) =s. Given > 0 and g > 0, the right hand side of (15) is less than one. Therefore, > L must hold in order for the left-hand side of (15) to be also less than one. Then we have the following theorem. A formal proof is relegated to Appendix A.
Theorem 1
If is su¢ciently small, the economy converges to a unique balanced growth path that is locally stable. On the balanced growth path, the equilibrium growth rate g of technology is positive and determined by the following condition.
(1 ) ( )
Equation (16) is a quadratic equation for which the solution is quite complicated. 9 Therefore, we will analyze (16) in the next section. However, it is useful to …rst consider a limiting case of g given by approaching zero.
This special case previews our results that the growth rate g is a strictly increasing function in the share s of pro…t assigned to basic R&D and a potentially inverted-U function in patentability . 10 From the above expression, it may seem that the non-monotonic e¤ect of on g is entirely built-in through the spillover function because lim !0 H B = s is independent of . However, this is not true in the general case of > 0. In the case of > 0, patentability has both positive and negative e¤ects on the equilibrium allocation of H B (s; ). The positive e¤ect of on H B arises from the direct e¤ect of raising the patentability of basic inventions that increases the incentives for basic R&D. The negative e¤ect of on H B arises from an indirect e¤ect of patentability that increases applied R&D by so much that it crowds out basic R&D through the resource constraint on skilled labor. Intuitively, there is a positive e¤ect of on applied R&D H A because a larger increases the 9 See Appendix A for an explicit solution of g . 10 To be more precise, lim !0 g is an inverted-U function within the feasible range of if and only if 0 < < 1 L . If 1 L , then lim !0 g would be a monotonically decreasing function in 2 ( L ; 1). If = 0, then lim !0 g would be a monotonically increasing function in . 13 waiting pool of industrially applicable basic inventions. For a given arrival rate of applied inventions, a larger waiting pool requires more applied R&D, which in turn crowds out basic R&D. When the discount rate approaches zero, this negative crowding-out e¤ect and the positive incentive e¤ect cancel each other. When is strictly positive, it is the interaction between these general-equilibrium e¤ects and the spillover function that drives our results in the next section. Finally, H B (s; ) continues to be a monotonically increasing function in s when > 0.
E¤ects of patent instruments
In the previous section, we have developed an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied research as well as characterizing the dynamic behavior of the model (Theorem 1). In this section, we investigate how the patentability of basic R&D and the division of pro…t between basic and applied researchers a¤ect economic growth.
Patentability of basic R&D has four e¤ects on technological progress. First, it increases patented basic inventions by raising the probability that a basic invention is patentable. Second, increasing patentability reduces knowledge spillovers from pure knowledge. Finally, increasing patentability has the positive incentive e¤ect and the negative crowding-out e¤ect on basic R&D H B as described in the previous section. The following proposition is our …rst key result, which demonstrates that the e¤ect of raising the patentability of basic R&D on the equilibrium growth rate g is generally non-monotonic except when is either su¢ciently large or equal to zero. When is su¢ciently large, g is monotonically decreasing in . In the unlikely case that the spillover function is independent of pure knowledge (i.e., = 0), g is monotonically increasing in .
then g is …rstly increasing and eventually decreasing in the patentability of basic R&D; therefore, the relationship between g and is non-monotonic. If = 0, then g is monotonically increasing in . 11 It is useful to note that s (1 s)b=a can be re-expressed as s(1 L ), which is a su¢cient condition for < 1 L given s 2 (0; 1).
Proof. In (16), the left-hand side (LHS) is decreasing in g while the righthand side (RHS) is increasing in g. Furthermore, RHS is increasing in . Therefore, if LHS is weakly decreasing in , then the equilibrium growth rate g must be decreasing in . The necessary and su¢cient condition for RHS to be weakly decreasing in is 1 . In other words, if 1 L , then g is monotonically decreasing in for 2 ( L ; 1). Taking the total di¤erentials with respect to g and in (16) yields
in which the inequality holds if s (1 s)b=a. Furthermore, we know that so long as > 0, lim !1 dg =d < 0. Therefore, g must be a nonmonotonic function in if 0 < s (1 s)b=a. Finally, if = 0, then dg =d > 0.
In addition to the analytical result in Proposition 1, we have also conducted a large number of numerical simulations, and the only non-linear con…guration that we …nd is an inverted U. These results explain the pros and cons of increasing the patentability of basic R&D. As mentioned above, increasing the patentability of basic research has the following e¤ects on g . First, it increases the probability that a basic invention is patentable. As a result, the size of the waiting pool W t increases leading to a larger number of matched invention pairs N t . It can be shown that 12 This positive e¤ect of patentability on technological progress is re ‡ected in the upward sloping part of the inverted U unless is su¢ciently large. If 1 L , then the equilibrium growth rate is monotonically decreasing in because the remaining positive incentive e¤ect of is dominated by its negative e¤ects on pure knowledge spillovers and the crowding out of basic R&D.
A negative e¤ect of on g emerges from the externality of pure knowledge. Raising the patentability of basic inventions reduces the accumulation of pure knowledge. Recall that the cumulative stock of pure knowledge K t has a spillover e¤ect on research productivity. Therefore, the degree of knowledge spillovers from pure knowledge decreases with . It can be shown that @ @ Kt Bt < 0 holds on the balanced growth path. Because the knowledge spillover e¤ect is a fundamental source of long-run growth (see for example Romer (1990) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991)), the decrease in knowledge spillovers slows down economic growth. This negative e¤ect of on economic growth is re ‡ected in the downward sloping part of the inverted U unless is equal to zero. When = 0, the equilibrium growth rate becomes monotonically increasing in because the remaining negative crowding-out e¤ect of is dominated by its positive e¤ects on patented basic inventions and the incentives for basic R&D.
Next we consider the pro…t-division rule s as an alternative patent instrument. The pro…t-division rule s controls the capital gain that is received by basic researchers, sV t Z t , whereas the patentability parameter a¤ects the initial expected return on basic research, Z t . We may interpret an increase in s as a strengthening of patent protection for basic R&D relative to that of applied R&D. 13 
Proposition 2
The relationship between the pro…t share s of basic R&D and the technology growth rate g is monotonically positive.
Proof. Recall that the LHS of (16) is decreasing in g while the RHS is increasing in g. Furthermore, RHS is decreasing in s and LHS is independent of s. Therefore, the equilibrium growth rate g must be increasing in s.
Proposition 2 shows that the growth rate is an increasing function in the pro…t share s of basic research. Intuitively, the growth rate of B t is determined by basic R&D H B , which in turn is strictly increasing in s. Furthermore, on the balanced-growth path, the growth rate of N t is equal to the growth rate of B t . Although increasing s reduces the equilibrium arrival rate of applied inventions, this reduction in does not a¤ect the growth rate but only the steady-state ratio of N=B, which has a level e¤ect on social welfare as shown in the next section. Therefore, strengthening patent protection for basic R&D relative to applied R&D results in a faster growth rate. Because s < 1, there does not exist an interior growth-maximizing pro…t-division rule.
The drastically di¤erent growth e¤ects of the two patent instruments arise for the following reasons. Strengthening patent protection for basic R&D via the pro…t-division rule stimulates basic R&D without sti ‡ing the spillover e¤ects of pure knowledge. However, increasing the patentability of basic R&D eventually decreases basic research due to a crowding-out e¤ect on skilled labor and also reduces the spillover e¤ect from pure knowledge.
Optimal coordination of patent instruments
Propositions 1 and 2 reveal that the two patent instruments, the patentability of basic R&D and the pro…t-division rule s, are useful policy levers for controlling the equilibrium growth rate in the decentralized economy. In this section, we demonstrate that the steady-state welfare-maximizing allocation can be achieved in the decentralized economy only if both patent instruments are present. Therefore, although the pro…t-division rule may be more e¤ec-tive than the patentability of basic R&D in stimulating basic research and technological progress simultaneously, a benevolent patent authority requires both patent instruments in achieving the socially optimal allocation.
Consider a social planner's problem as follows. (3), (5), and (6) along with _ N = aH A =S (K t ; B t K t ) and _ B = bH B =S (K t ; B t K t ). Imposing symmetry of X t (i) on (1) yields
The resource constraint for unskilled labor implies X t = L=N t , where L is the total supply of unskilled labor. Therefore, (18) becomes C t = (N t )
Taking log yields ln C t = (" 1)
where the exogenous L has been dropped. The equilibrium growth rate of technology in (13) and the equilibrium arrival rate of applied inventions in (14) hold along the balanced growth path for both the decentralized and centralized economies. Using (13) and (14), we can re-express N=B as
Substituting N=B and g into the utility of households (19) yields
where B 0 is the initial number of basic inventions. The resource constraint for high-skill labor implies H A = 1 H B , and N=B implies H B b=(b + a ).
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Simple optimization yields the socially optimal given by
where 1 > L is assumed. The socially optimal H B is characterized by the following equation.
This quadratic equation has two solutions. Deriving the second-order condition, one can easily show that the larger solution is the locally optimal H B given by
To ensure that this interior optimum is achievable, we naturally assume that
which must hold given a su¢ciently small . This parameter restriction simply implies that at H B = H B , N=B < . To ensure that the locally optimal H B is also the global optimum, we impose the following condition.
Finally, by (13) , the market equilibrium H B in the decentralized economy can be expressed as
where the equilibrium growth rate g satis…es (16) . Comparing the optimal H B and the equilibrium H B , we can show the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If < 1 L , then the patent authority can achieve the steady-state welfare-maximizing allocation in the decentralized economy by using the two patent instruments f ; sg. To do so, the patentability parameter is set to its optimal level = 1 , and the pro…t-division rule s is set to an intermediate value s within the feasible range of s.
Proof. First, set to the optimal level = 1 as in (21) . Then, we show that there exists a feasible value of s = s that equates the equilibrium H B to the optimal H B . By (22) , the optimal H B 2 (0; 1) is independent of s while the equilibrium H B is strictly increasing in s by Proposition 2. As s ! 1, it can be shown by using (16) and (23) that H B ! 1. Therefore, it su¢ces to show that as s approaches its lower bound given by b= (b + a ) (from > L ), H B approaches a value that is below the optimal H B . As s ! b=(b + a ), it can be shown by using (16) and (23) that H B ! b=(b + a ), which is less than H B .
Conclusion
In this study, we have developed an R&D-based growth model with basic and applied research to analyze the growth and welfare e¤ects of two patent instruments (a) the patentability of basic R&D and (b) the division of pro…t between basic and applied researchers. We …nd that the patentability of basic R&D has either a monotonically negative e¤ect or an inverted-U e¤ect on technological progress. Therefore, although increasing the patentability of basic R&D may have contributed to economic growth since the 1980's with continual technological progress on biotechnology and information technology, the inverted-U relationship suggests that further increasing the patentability of basic R&D might eventually depress economic growth. As Mowery et al. (2004) argue, increasing the patentability of basic R&D makes basic research discoveries less available to researchers resulting into a reduction in knowledge spillovers. Furthermore, we …nd that the equilibrium growth rate is monotonically increasing in the share of pro…t assigned to basic researchers. Therefore, strengthening the bargaining power of basic researchers relative to applied researchers may be a superior policy lever for achieving the dual objectives of stimulating basic R&D and economic growth. Nonetheless, for a benevolent patent authority, both patent instruments are needed for achieving the socially optimal allocation in the decentralized economy.
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Appendix A: Proof of Theorem 1
By using the pro…t function in (2) and the free-entry and non-arbitrage conditions in (4), (7), (8) , and (9), and by de…ning c t C t =("N t V t ), k t K t =B t , n t N t =B t and u t W t =B t , we obtain
Claim 1 Note that > (b=a)(1 s)=s must hold in order for t > 0, which gives rise to the lower bound of given by L (b=a)(1 s)=s.
By using the Euler equation,
is also derived. From (3),
From (6),
From (2), (7), (12) , and (25) , noting the de…nition of the spillover function S(:),
From (2), (7), and (11), the skill premium is given by
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From (24)- (29), the equilibrium dynamical system of our model is given by
and
in which : B t =B t satis…es (29) . Firstly, steady states of the system are identi…ed in what follows. In a balanced growth path (BGP), all variables grow at constant rates; speci…-cally, in our model,
Denote by g the steady-state growth rate of variables B t ; K t ; N t ; and W t : 18 Denote the values of (c t ; k t ; n t ; u t ) along a BGP by (c ; k ; n ; u ): The trivial BGP is excluded by assuming g > 0; which implies
in which the use has been made of
B t =B t with (27) . Noting
B t =B t with (28), g > 0 also implies
By _ C t =C t V t =V t = _ N t =N t , equations (25) and (26) imply
Cancelling out n from (36) and (37), 
18 From (1) and (11), 
By _ N t =N t = _ B t =B t with (25) and (29),
Cancelling out c ; k ; and u from (40), with (35)-(39a) and g = c by (26) ,
Because the left-hand side is a strictly decreasing function in g and the right-hand side is a strictly increasing function in g , a unique positive BGP growth rate g exists. Because g > 0 holds, c > holds (1 =c > 0). This ensures the feasible values of the fractions n and u : n 2 (0; 1) and u 2 (0; 1) hold by (38) and (39a). The fraction of pure knowledge k also satis…es k 2 (0; 1) by (35) .
In what follows, the saddle-path stability of the dynamical system for (c t ; k t ; n t ; u t ) ; (31)-(34), is proved. From (32) and (35), since _ Bt Bt > 0 by the assumption, _ k t > 0 holds for all k t < k and _ k t < 0 holds for all k t > k : Thus, for any small > 0; there exists a su¢ciently large T < 1 such that k t 2 (k ; k + ) holds for all t T: Due to the continuity of the system, it would su¢ce to analyze the stability of the 3 3 dynamical system omitting _ k t where k 0 = k : We consider this abbreviated system omitting _ k t : Using (35)-(40), the log-linearized version of this abbreviated system with (ĉ t ;n t ;û t ) = ln We can formally prove that the coe¢cient matrx for the original 4 4 linearized system (including _ k t ) has the three same eigenvalues as those of the coe¢cient matrix for the abbreviated 3 3 linearized system (omitting _ k t with k t = k ). We can also show that the remaining one eigenvalue is a multiple root that is equal to g ; which is negative. Therefore, since k t is a non-jumpable variable, it su¢ces to verify only the stability of the abbreviated 3 3 system in our model. s=b is a composite parameter. Using this expression, we …nd that g > (1 2 L = ) can be re-expressed as s (1 ) ( )
When this inequality holds, the eigenvalues of M , denoted by 1 ; 2 ; and 3 , satisfy 1 2 3 > 0 and 1 + 2 + 3 < 0. This implies that M has two negative and one positive eigenvalues, which proves the saddle-path stability of the system. Claim 2 If is su¢ciently small (or < 2 L ), then the dynamical system is locally saddle-path stable. 20 Note that the determinant of M is equal to b (1 s) (g + ) + (g ) 2 + 2 g + as (g ) 2 (g + + ) :
